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Abstract 
In less developed countries like Peru, it is very frequent to observe that, in poor households, 
parents and children work together doing household work in their own home. This fact is even 
more evident among girls, who work at home cleaning, cooking, taking care of younger siblings, 
etc., which may deter them from attending school. In the current literature on child labour, it is 
always assumed that this occurs because girls are more productive at home than boys; therefore is 
more likely to observe girls staying home and boys working in the labour market. To check to 
what extent this common assumption is true, this paper estimates the determinants of household 
work in Peru, and obtains the parameters of the production function of “chores”. Since the total 
amount of “chores” is not observable, I use wages and the first order conditions of a standard time 
allocation model to estimate the model. The estimated production function is consistent with a 
strictly concave production function in which the inputs are substitutes. It also shows that girls 
have a higher marginal product than boys in the production of “chores”. All data was taken from 
the Peruvian Living Standard Measurement Survey of 1997 and 2000. 
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Who does the chores? Estimation of a household production function in Peru 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, literature on child labour has paid special attention to the work of children as 
household workers, work which is understood as that performed at home involving the production 
of output for direct family consumption, but not for market sale.1 Like standard child labour, 
household work consumes time and effort, which leaves less time for children to do other 
activities, like studying. It could also deter girls in less-developed countries from attending school, 
as some papers suggest.2 
 
To give an idea of the magnitude of this phenomenon, in Peru (a poor and less-developed country), 
three of every four children work some positive number of hours per week on housework, where 
the total average of hours worked is roughly 11 hours per week. In the six-to-fourteen-year age 
range, poor girls work at home, on average, twice as much as non-poor boys do. In addition, girls 
who do not attend school work more hours on housework than girls who do attend school, and the 
gap between those averages increases with age.3 
 
These facts suggest that it is important to study and understand this phenomenon from an 
economic point of view. What makes adults and children work in this activity? What variables 
could increase or decrease the time individuals spend on housework? Why is it that we observe 
more housework performed by girls than by boys? Literature on household economics offers 
models that can be used to examine this problem in depth. To answer these questions, I find the 
main determinants of household work and estimate a household production function, controlling 
by those variables that affect the production function. Using econometric methods and survey data, 
this paper achieves both tasks. 
 
In the setting proposed in this paper, wages play an important role in the time allotted to household 
work, since wages are the opportunity costs of hours spent on this activity. Standard neoclassical 
                                               
1 Household work includes activities like cleaning, cooking, taking care of younger children, etc. 
2 Levison and Moe (1998). 
3 These figures were calculated by the author using the Peruvian Living Standard Measurement Survey of year 2000. 
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theory predicts a negative relationship between wages and hours of housework. In addition – as 
will be clear in the empirical section — wages are an important instrument in the estimation of the 
parameters of the production function. 
 
It is also important to note that household work is not always seen as a “bad thing” for children, 
because it can create a sense of responsibility in children and develops skills that will be useful in 
the future. It is reasonable to think about an “acceptable” level of household work performed by 
children. The problem with household work occurs when parents make children work so many 
hours that they do not have enough time to study, play or rest. Parents can use household work as a 
strategy to increase a family’s total income, in the sense that if children do the chores at home, the 
parents may have more free time to offer in the labour market.4  
 
Besides classical papers on the theory of allocation of time (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977; 
Rosenzweig, 1980; Birdsall, 1982; Newman & Gertler, 1994), some works have developed this 
theory in the context of household work with child workers. For example, Brown et al. (2003) 
present a theoretical model of child labour with household work, but assume a Ricardian 
production function with fixed coefficients, which yields specialisation of children in housework 
or market work. Recently, Garcia (2006) has presented a theoretical model which approaches this 
problem using the “unitary approach”5, in which household work, child labour, and hours of 
children’s education are determined simultaneously along with the parents’ labour supply and 
household work. In that model, we do not observe specialisation; the time is allocated according to 
the opportunity cost of the activities individuals may perform. 
 
Several empirical papers estimate the determinants of child labour, schooling, and household work 
under the time-allocation framework and using Probit or Tobit methods, while others use 
simultaneous-equations methods. Skoufias (1994) studies the effect of market wages on time 
allocation in rural India. This study shows significant differences between boys and girls when it 
comes to participation in productive activities within the household and schooling. Using average 
                                               
4 Skoufias (1994) proposed this idea. 
5 The unitary approach considers the existence of a family utility function, and an aggregated family budget constraint. 
The resources are allocated in order to maximise this utility subject to the budget and time constraints. Although there 
are other approaches, which include bargaining between individuals and individual utility functions, in this case it 
seems reasonable to assume that there is no bargaining process because children simply follow parents’ decisions. 
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community wages to estimate parents’ and children’s wages, the author finds that wages have no 
effect on participation in household production activities, and that only the child’s wage has a 
negative effect on leisure and a positive effect on the remaining activities – home production, 
schooling and market work. DeGraff et al. (1996), using data from the Philippines, estimate a 
simultaneous Probit model in which the endogenous variables are dummy variables of school 
attendance, market work and household work. They find that household work increases with age, 
and that its incidence is higher for girls. Some household characteristics such as number of siblings 
and housing material have an impact on the hours worked by children at home. In a later paper, 
DeGraff and Bilsborrow (2003) estimate the same model using the same exogenous variables, but 
this time they estimate only the reduced form equations by the Tobit method; however, their 
results are not good because almost none of the variables are a good predictor of household work 
hours. Levison & Moe (1998) analyse household work as a deterrent to schooling. Focusing on 
unmarried adolescent girls ages 10 to 19, they find that household work may present a more 
significant barrier to schooling for girls than boys. They do not include wages in the regressions. 
Binder and Scrogin (1999) estimate the determinants of child work in Mexico. In particular, they 
focus their attention on the effect of parents’ wages and children’s wages on their labour decisions. 
Using imputed child wages, they find a negative effect on the participation of children in 
substantial household responsibilities. They also find that this participation is lower for boys and 
for younger siblings. Hours worked in housework are also fewer for boys than for girls.  
 
In a different work outside the child labour literature, Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) identify and 
estimate a household production model. Based on Gronau’s model, they estimate the parameters of 
a quadratic household production function for married couples in Sweden. As they argue, the 
inclusion of wages in the regressions may bias the results of the home production estimation, 
because individuals with low productivity at home will be most likely to have a paid job. That 
sample selection must therefore be corrected, taking into account the decisions of males and 
females to participate in the labour market. Due to difficulties in the estimation of the utility 
function, the authors focus their work on the estimation of the production function with the 
correction of sample selection. 
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In short, the current literature on this topic has identified some of the main variables that determine 
housework. However, it has not considered the interaction between parents’ and children’s 
housework in the production of chores nor has it estimated this production function. In addition, 
most papers report that girls work more hours than boys at home, and provide explanations for this 
result related to customs and differences in productivity. Here I do not assume that girls are more 
productive at home than boys, but the estimation results show that indeed girls are more productive 
at home.   
 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 summarises the empirical model to be estimated and 
describes the econometric strategy to conduct the estimations; section 3 briefly describes the data; 
section 4 presents and discusses the results, and finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Empirical Model 
 
In this section, I briefly review the model presented in Garcia (2006) and derive the econometric 
specification. The model is a standard model of time allocation where household work has been 
included as a single activity that the children and one of the parents can perform. The time spent 
on this activity produces a certain level of output which represents total amount of housework 
done (for example, how clean or neat the house is). To simplify the model, it is assumed that there 
are only three individuals in the household: the head of household, the spouse and only one child. 6 
The spouse spends her time (T) in household work ( 1z ) or market work ( 1H ) thus her time 
constraint is THz  11 , but the head of household only works full time in the labour market. The 
child may spend her time studying (E), working at home doing housework ( 2z ) or working in the 
labour market ( 2H ), thus her time constraint is TEHz  22 . The head of household is the 
family planner who allocates the time of the spouse and the child to maximise the aggregated 
family utility ),,( EZcU  where c is the total aggregated consumption, Z the total level of 
housework produced. Housework can be produced at home or bought in the market, so its total 
amount is expressed by the equation ),( 210 zzffZ  , where 0f  are the hired domestic services, 
and ),( 21 zzf  is a strictly concave home production function whose inputs are the hours that the 
                                               
6 If there are more children, they do not work nor do housework. 
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spouse and the child spend at home doing housework. The household faces a budget constraint, 
where the aggregated household income is the sum of the labour income of the head of household 
(Y ), the spouse ( 11Hw ) and the child ( 22 Hw ), and the total expenditure is 0Pfc  , where c  
represents the family consumption of a composite good (whose price is set to one) and P is the 
price of housekeeping service. The optimisation problem the family planner solves is to maximise 
the utility function subject to the time constraints, the budget constraint and the equation which 
defines the total amount of Z.7 
 
The strategy to estimate the structural parameters of the model is to obtain information from the 
first order conditions. According to the solution of the theoretical model and assuming the interior 
solution, the first order conditions yield: 
P
wzzf 1211 ),(               (1) 
P
wzzf 2212 ),(                (2) 
where if  is the marginal product with respect to input i. Equations (1) and (2) determine the 
optimal values of the household work variables ),,( 2111 Pwwzz   and ),,( 2122 Pwwzz   which are 
the demands for child and spouse’s household work.  
 
The total output of chores is not observed; we only observe the time employed in that activity. 
However, by working with the first order conditions we can recover the structural parameters of 
the production function.  
 
The first order conditions (1) and (2) say also that the marginal product of inputs must equal the 
ratio of wages with respect to the price of housekeeping services (the opportunity cost of 
household work). It is also true that 
2
1
212
211
),(
),(
w
w
zzf
zzf
               (3) 
                                               
7 See Garcia (2006) for all theoretical results on the child labor supply function and the optimal hours of education. 
They are not stated here because I want to focus on the production function only. 
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so the family will allocate the time such that the ratio of marginal products equals the ratio of 
wages. 
 
The next step is to define a parametric functional form for the production function. In the 
theoretical model we assumed the home production function is a concave function. For empirical 
purposes it is convenient to assume a quadratic function8 
zzzbzf 





2
1)(                     (4) 
where  21 zzz  ,  21 bbb  , and   is a 2x2 symmetric negative definite matrix. The first 
order conditions are:  
P
wzzb 12121111                (5) 
P
wzzb 22221122                (6) 
It is assumed that the parameters 1b  and 2b  are a linear combination of individual and household 
characteristics and an error term. 
2,1 jxb jjjj               (7) 
where µ1,µ2 ~ N(0, Σ).  
 
These equations are a system of structural equations that determine simultaneously the values of z1 
and z2. 
 
The goal is to estimate equations (5) and (6). Since this is a simultaneous equation problem, one 
might try to use one of the standard methods in the econometric literature, like the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method. However, there is a significant problem of missing data since wages can 
be observed only when individuals participate in the labour market. In the reduced form of the 
system, hours worked at home depend on the wages of both the spouse and the child, and as a 
consequence, we can use only those observations where both the spouse and the child work in the 
labour market. This creates a sample selection problem which may bias the parameters estimated 
                                               
8 Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) use this function in their work. One of its advantages is that the derivatives are linear 
and it is easy to verify if time inputs are substitutes or complements. It is also easy to introduce stochastic error terms. 
Ransom (1987) also uses quadratic functions but in utility functions. 
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by 2SLS. I would namely use only information of individuals that work in the market, who may be 
less productive in housework than individuals who stay at home doing chores. Estimation by 
standard 2SLS gives inconsistent estimates of the parameters due to the sample selection bias. 
 
It is helpful to express equations (5)-(6) in the standard simultaneous equations notation9. 
1
1
10221 uP
wzz 





 1xβ              (8) 
2
2
10112 uP
wzz 





 2xα             (9) 
where vectors x1 and x2 may contain common explanatory variables as well as some specific 
variables, and the error terms 1u and 2u  are normal variables with zero mean and variance-
covariance matrix uu . 
 
The reduced form of system (8)-(9) is: 
111 vz  x             (10) 
222 vz  x            (11) 
 
Where vector x includes a constant term, Pw1 , Pw2 , 1x and 2x . The error terms v1 and v2 are 
linear combinations of u1 and u2, and are also normally distributed with zero mean and covariance 
matrix 11)(   uuvv , where 








1
1
2
1


. We can estimate equations (10) and (11) only 
when we observe w1 and w2 at the same time.  
 
To correct for selection bias (as in Kerkhofs and Kooreman, 2003), I include two more equations 
representing the decision whether the individuals (spouse and child) participate in the labour 
market or not. 
111
*
1   AI            (12) 
222
*
2   AI            (13) 
                                               
9 To avoid cumbersome notation, all subscripts referred to the i-th observation have been omitted from equations (8)-
(13). 
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where *1I  and 
*
2I  are latent variables that determine the participation in the labour market of each 
individual, and 1A and 2A are vectors of variables that determine such participations. The spouse 
participates in the labour market if and only if 0*1 I  and the child participates if 0
*
2 I . The error 
terms are assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean, 1)var()var( 21    
and  ),cov( 21 . Moreover, 











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

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




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







 u
uuuN
u
u
,0~
2
1
2
1
 
 
Equations (10) and (11) cannot be estimated by OLS because: 
 
0),/()0,0/( 222111
*
2
*
1   AAvEIIvE ii   2,1i . 
 
The procedure I use to estimate the model is an application of the Heckman-Lee method of 
estimation of simultaneous equations with sample selection to the case of double selection10.  
 
(a) In the first stage, equations (12) and (13) are estimated using bivariate Probit. 
(b) In the second stage, using 1ˆ , 2ˆ  and ˆ I estimate 
 
2,1)0,0/( 212121
*
2
*
1  iMMIIvE iii   
 
by )ˆ()ˆ1( 12 jiij PPM  
 , where 
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ(
),(
2211
ˆ 2121ˆ 2211



AAF
ddf
P A
jA
j




  and F is a 
standard bivariate normal c.d.f.11. Using the moments of a truncated multivariate normal 
distribution12, let: 
                                               
10 See Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980) and Tunali (1986). 
11 See Fishe et al. (1980), Maddala (1983), p. 282. 
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111 ˆAc  , 222 ˆAc  , )ˆ()ˆ1( 12
212
1 ccC  
  and )ˆ()ˆ1( 21
212
2 ccC  
 . 
 
P1 and P2 can be expressed as, 
  12122111 )ˆ,,()](1)[(ˆ)](1)[(   ccFCcCcP  
  12122112 )ˆ,,()](1)[()](1)[(ˆ   ccFCcCcP  
 
where  and  are the standard univariate normal p.d.f. and c.d.f. respectively.  
(c) In the next step, I estimate the “structural” equations (8) and (9) by 2SLS (instrumental 
variables) where 12Mˆ  and 21Mˆ  are included in the main regression as well as in the set of 
instruments. The coefficients of these variables are the covariances 
),cov( 1iu and ),cov( 2iu , i=1,2, respectively. 
 
 
3. The data 
 
I use the Peruvian Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) for the years 1997 and 2000 to 
estimate the model. This is a nationwide stratified survey which collects information on 
employment and time allocation as well as a detailed description of socioeconomic characteristics 
of the household. It contains data on individuals six years of age and older.  
 
One limitation of the estimation method proposed here is that it requires the observation of wages. 
In spite of the fact that child labour is a significant concern in Peru, where one in every four 
children works at an economic activity, only a minority of working children receive a wage. This 
dramatically reduces the sample size, which may affect the consistency of the econometric results. 
For this reason, I pooled the surveys of 1997 and 2000 in order to increase the sample size. Since 
many households were interviewed in both surveys, I included each household only once to avoid 
possible correlation between observations. I thus used the whole sample of 1997 and only those 
households from 2000 that were not surveyed in 1997. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 See Kotz, Balakrishna and Johnson (2000), p.207. 
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For empirical purposes, I define a “child” –who may potentially work– as an individual in the 
household who is between six and seventeen years old. Nevertheless, when I counted the family 
size, I included all the individuals belonging to a household, regardless of age. 
 
Because the number of “children” in a household varies, I took into account only one child per 
household when I performed the econometric estimations. It is not feasible to estimate a model 
with a variable number of children. The criterion used in selecting the one child per household was 
that it must be the child who worked the greatest number of hours in the labour market. If there 
were no working children in the household, I picked the oldest child in the subset of “children” 
aged 6 to 17. 
 
The variables “Household work” and “Market work” were defined as the hours individuals spent 
on those activities during a week. Household work is that work performed at home involving 
household chores, whose output is not intended to be sold in the marketplace. By contrast, market 
work is defined as any activity (generated by the employed or self-employed) executed with the 
objective of selling the output in the market. 
 
In the survey, there is a third labour category, that of “Non-paid family work”, defined as hours 
worked in a family business or farm, without receiving a monetary wage. Individuals who are non-
paid family workers were excluded from the sample because it seems that their behaviour is 
systematically different than that which I propose in the model. In my model, wages determine the 
time allocation of family members. In the case of non-paid family workers, since they do not 
receive wages, other variables determine their participation in economic activities. Consequently, I 
excluded from the sample all households in which at least one of the members (head, spouse or 
child) is a non-paid family worker. 
 
Concerning unemployed workers, not all of them were included in the sample. The criteria were to 
include an individual who chose not to work and to exclude individuals who may report zero hours 
of work due to labour force conditions, which are beyond their control. Retired people, individuals 
who were handicapped, the unemployed still in the process of applying for new jobs, workers on 
vacation, sick workers, and workers on strike were excluded from the sample.  
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To calculate the weekly wages, I used the information provided in the survey on wages, salaries 
and earnings received in the last seven days in the main job. Since the time unit of these earnings 
may vary (daily, monthly, quarterly, etc.), the reported wages were multiplied or divided 
appropriately by an scalar, in order to convert all earnings to weekly earnings. The main problem 
with wages is that they are not observed when the individual does not work in the market. Unlike 
most who do empirical work on child labour (which usually does not get good results on the wage 
effect), I did not impute wages, but left them as missing data wherever they were not reported.  
 
Additional restrictions were applied to the sample. Households with no children between the ages 
of six and seventeen were excluded. I also excluded single-parent households. In other words, I 
restricted the sample to households with a household head and spouse, and with at least one 
“child”. Finally, I excluded all cases with data missing from the variables hours of home work and 
market work. 
 
The following table shows descriptive statistics on all variables included in regressions. There are 
two columns; the first one includes only the observations which were included in Table 2 (a 
bivariate Probit estimation), and the second column includes those which were employed in tables 
3 and 4 (an instrumental variables regression). Although the full sample is larger, its size decreased 
due to missing data. 
 
Even though the sample size is considerably smaller in the second column, I do not observe major 
changes in the sample averages of the variables. There are a few cases on which I would like to 
remark. Concerning a child’s age, the second sample selects older children, perhaps because the 
definition of “child” selects –in many cases- working children. There is also an important selection 
by gender for the same reason, because empirical evidence on child labour reveals that boys are 
more likely to work than girls. Regarding the level of education of the spouse and the head of 
household, both are lower in the second group. Since the small sample size is the result of the 
selection of households where the child and the spouse work, this selection seems to be correlated 
with those low levels of education. Something similar occurs with child’s earnings, spouse’s 
earnings and head of household’s earnings. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample in 
bivariate Probit  
Sample in 
simultaneous 
equation 
Variable name    
Child's weekly hours of housework 9.6747  10.4433 
 (9.9932)  (10.9868) 
Spouse's weekly hours of housework 42.1712  38.2401 
 (18.7670)  (17.9523) 
Child's age 12.3805  15.3607 
 (3.5551)  (2.0976) 
Fraction of male children 0.5029  0.6464 
 (0.5001)  (0.4813) 
Spouse's age 39.1720  41.5203 
 (9.6560)  (7.7994) 
Spouse's years of schooling 7.9738  5.0444 
 (4.6873)  (4.3314) 
Head of household's years of schooling 9.4184  7.1184 
 (4.4073)  (4.0113) 
# of adults in household 2.9286  3.0454 
 (1.2922)  (1.4131) 
   # children < 18 in household 2.7298  3.7028 
 (1.3785)  (1.6760) 
   # of children < 6 years old in household 0.9156  0.8991 
 (0.9489)  (0.9781) 
   # girls 11 – 17 years old in household 0.5464  0.8235 
 (0.7074)  (0.8653) 
# adult women 18-55 years in household 1.3499  1.4491 
 (0.6948)  (0.7891) 
Child's weekly earnings (in Peruvian Soles of 2000) 102.9098*  64.6644 
 (182.7668)  (66.2594) 
Spouse's weekly earnings (in Peruvian Soles of 2000) 48.6639**  43.6597 
 (34.0677)  (27.3152) 
Head of household's weekly earnings (in Peruvian 
Soles of 2000) 202.2015  119.4114 
 (287.6296)  (81.0058) 
Per capita weekly income from other household 
members (in Peruvian Soles 2000) 46.7616  37.2842 
 (118.1911)  (65.0598) 
Per capita weekly non labor income (in Peruvian 
Soles of 2000) 16.6871  8.1973 
 (31.8968)  (7.4411) 
# of floors in dwelling 1.2450  1.2094 
 (0.5166)  (0.4910) 
Water connection inside dwelling 0.7489  0.6995 
 (0.4338)  (0.4616) 
Material of Walls: Adobe 0.3094  0.3545 
 (0.4624)  (0.4816) 
Material of Walls: Bricks or Concrete 0.5414  0.4564 
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 (0.4984)  (0.5015) 
Dwelling in urban area 0.8011  0.7482 
 (0.3993)  (0.4370) 
Child attends school? 0.9099  0.6163 
 (0.2865)  (0.4896) 
    
Number of observation 1681  75 
Standard error in parenthesis    
* Includes 151 observations only    
** Includes 748 observations only    
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Participation in the labour market 
 
The first step is to estimate the bivariate Probit model for the participation of the spouse and child 
in the labour market. In each equation, I included variables related to individual characteristics 
such as age, sex, and education and variables that describe household characteristics such as 
wages, income, number of adults, and number of children younger than 18 years old. Since this is 
a stratified sample, weighted regressions were used. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the participation in the labour market for the spouse and the child. In 
the “Probit” column I show the results of individual Probit regressions, assuming that the two 
decisions are not correlated. On the other hand, the “BiProbit” column estimates a bivariate Probit 
regression. As we can see, the results in the first column are very similar to those in the second 
column. These results in Table 2 are consistent with what standard theory predicts. In the case of 
the spouse’s participation, the variables of age, age squared and education have the correct signs 
and are significant. The “number of children of less than six years of age” variable has a negative 
sign and it is significant, which means that this variable is an important barrier to a spouse’s 
participation in the labour market. The head’s wage and the income of other household members 
have a negative sign, which would mean that the probability of participation in the labour market 
decreases when these variables increase. In contrast, the sign of the per capita non-labour income 
is positive. It is hard to find an explanation for this result, because standard labour supply theory 
says that unearned income has a negative impact on labour supply. Finally, the “spouse’s sex” 
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variable has no effect on that participation13. It seems that households in which the head is a 
woman (and the spouse is male) do not behave differently than those in which the head is male and 
the spouse is a woman. 
 
Table 2: Probit Estimation of Participation in Labour Market 
  Probit   Biprobit 
Spouse Coefficient  z  Coefficient  z 
   Spouse’s age 0.1035 *** 7.01  0.1175 *** 5.45 
   Spouse’s age square -0.0012 *** -7.10  -0.0014 *** -5.56 
   Spouse’s education (years) 0.0223 *** 3.11  0.0176 ** 2.02 
   Spouse’s sex (1=male, 0=female) 0.4300  1.12  0.5853  1.32 
   # of children < 6 years old -0.1308 *** -3.90  -0.1556 *** -3.84 
   Urban/Rural (urban=1, rural=0) -0.1157  -1.53  -0.0062  -0.07 
   Log(head’s wage) -0.2310 *** -6.52  -0.2591 *** -5.60 
   Log(per capita non-labour income) 0.0877 *** 3.10  0.0785 ** 2.27 
   Log(income of other household members) -0.0437 *** -3.08  -0.0566 *** -3.24 
   Constant -1.0529 *** -3.31  -1.2475 *** -2.60 
        
Number of obs 2452    1681   
Wald χ2(8) and χ2(19) 130.91    315.17   
Prob > χ2 0.00    0.00   
                
Child        
   Child’s age 0.1805 *** 7.93  0.1704 *** 6.85 
   Child’s sex (1=male, 0=female) 0.3088 ** 2.47  0.2811 ** 1.99 
   # adults in household -0.1704 *** -2.99  -0.1515 ** -2.44 
   # children < 18 0.1357 *** 3.67  0.1591 *** 3.79 
   # girls 11 – 17 years old -0.1204  -1.33  -0.2034 * -1.92 
   Urban/Rural (urban=1, rural=0) -0.1055  -0.79  -0.0794  -0.51 
   Log(head’s wage) -0.2198 *** -3.90  -0.1827 *** -2.65 
   Log(per capita non-labour income) -0.1321 *** -2.69  -0.1143 ** -2.04 
   Log(income of other household members) 0.0822 *** 2.72  0.0816 ** 2.32 
   Attends school? (1=yes, 0=no) -0.9331 *** -7.75  -0.9493 *** -6.90 
   Constant -1.7844 *** -4.23  -1.9309 *** -4.02 
        
Number of observations 2096    1681   
Wald χ2(7) 241.96    315.17   
Prob > χ2 0.00    0.00   
                
ρ --  --  0.1676341 ** 2.33 
Wald test of ρ=0: χ2(1)     5.45126   
Prob > chi2         0.0196     
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level   
                                               
13 In the sample, 95% of the spouses are women. 
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In the case of child labour force participation, the older the child is, the more likely it is that he or 
she will participate in the labour market. There is also a greater level of participation for boys than 
girls. These two results agree with many empirical papers on child labour14. Also, the number of 
adults in the household reduces the probability of child participation. An explanation for this result 
is that more adults in a household means more individuals who can work, and the household will 
thus be able to “buy” more education and more leisure time for the child; consequently, we would 
observe less child labour. The number of girls of ages 11 – 17 also has a negative impact on the 
participation in the labour market. I expected an opposite sign, since girls usually work at home, 
and this affords more time to boys to work in the market. 
 
Concerning the effect of the head of household’s wage, its coefficient is negative; non-labour 
income also has a negative effect on childhood participation, but the effect of the income of other 
members is positive. A possible explanation for the latter result is that if other members in the 
family (such as older siblings) work, the child may feel motivated to work as well. Finally, there is 
a negative relationship between school attendance and participation of children in the labour 
market. 
 
Regarding the other parameters and statistics, the parameter  , which is the correlation between 
the error terms in both equations in the bivariate Probit regression, is positive and significant. This 
means that whenever we observe a working spouse, it is more likely that we will also observe at 
least one working child in household, and this confirms that the bivariate Probit estimation is the 
correct method to use, rather than the standard Probit. The Wald statistic of joint significance of 
the variables shows that the model fits well. 
 
4.2 Determinants of household work 
 
The second step involves estimating the model by the two-stage least-squares method and 
correcting for sample selection as described in section 2. Table 3 presents the results of the 
estimation of equations (8) and (9), in which all tests are heteroskedasticity robust.  
                                               
14 See, for example, Binder and Scrogin (1999), Bhalotra (2001), DeGraff and Bilsborrow (2003). 
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Table 3: Determinants of the demand for household work 
                
Dependent Variable 
z1  
(Spouse's housework)  
z2  
(Child's housework) 
 Coef.  t  Coef.  t 
Household work: (instrumented)        
z1 --  --  -0.1618 * -1.90 
z2 -0.2438  -0.74  --  -- 
Wages:        
log(spouse's wage) -7.1215 *** -3.56  --  -- 
log(child's wage) --  --  -4.1978 *** -3.12 
log(price housekeeping) 34.5599 *** 6.15  1.2538  0.35 
Individual characteristics:        
Spouse's age 0.1384  0.42  -0.0436  -0.17 
Spouse's education -1.4894 *** -3.14  --  -- 
Child's age -4.4979 *** -4.44  0.9250  1.38 
Child's sex (1=male, 0=female) -10.4642 ** -2.24  -7.4784 *** -2.88 
Head of household characteristics        
Head’s wage 10.6052 *** 2.77  1.0485  0.52 
Head’s education -0.3877  -0.87  -0.8079 *** -2.91 
Household characteristics:        
# adult women 18-55 years 2.5086  0.91  -4.4265 *** -3.07 
# children 0-6 years 2.3750  0.79  -1.9290  -0.82 
Material of Walls: Adobe --  --  -7.5723 *** -3.15 
Material of Walls: Bricks or Concrete 2.8066  0.90  -2.8610  -0.98 
# of floors 11.4009 *** 2.78  --  -- 
Water connection inside dwelling -13.6501 *** -3.97  --  -- 
Sample Selection Variables:        
m12 -63.4020 *** -3.13  7.4663  0.54 
m21 -22.9564 *** -5.09  -2.6044  -0.81 
Constant: 30.3846  1.28  30.2469  1.47 
                
Number of observations 75    75   
R-squared 0.5719    0.4441   
F - statistic 9.48    4.72   
P-value 0.0000    0.0000   
Excluded instruments in spouse’s regression: Child’s wage and Material of Walls: Adobe 
Excluded instruments in child’s regression: Log of spouse’s wage, Spouse's education,  # of floors and 
Water connection inside dwelling  
First-stage F-stat on excluded instruments 10.34    12.88   
Anderson canonical correlation LR test 14.24    40.83   
P-value 0.0008    0.0000   
Hansen J statistic 1.70    2.16   
Chi-sq(1) P-value  0.1920    0.5408   
                
All tests are heteroskedasticity robust.        
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level   
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The sign of the derivative of z1 with respect to z2 is negative but not significant; the derivative of z2 
with respect to z1 is also negative but significant. Theory says that a positive sign of this parameter 
means the two labour inputs are complements, and that a negative sign corresponds to substitutes. 
Since both signs are negative, I suspect the fulfilment of the substitution hypothesis, but that 
evidence is not strong because one of the parameters is not significant.  
 
In relation to the relationship between hours worked at home and market wages, Table 3 shows 
that there is a significant negative relationship between those variables in the two equations, and 
the parameters are significantly different from zero. In the case of the market price of 
housekeeping services, the theory indicated that the relationship between household work and this 
price was positive. The results are consistent with this hypothesis in the first regression, but I 
cannot confirm that in the case of the child home labour equation, because the parameter is not 
significant. 
 
Some of the individual characteristics affected the hours spent doing household work. The more 
educated the spouse was, the fewer hours the spouse worked at home. Also, the spouse’s age was 
not significant in either regression. In the case of the child’s characteristics, the age and sex 
variables affected the spouse’s hours of household work, but only the child’s sex affected the 
child’s household work. An older child in the household meant less housework for the spouse, but 
surprisingly, a male child in the house meant less housework performed by the spouse. On the 
other hand, older children participate more in housework than younger children, but the effect is 
not significant. It is also observed in Table 2 that girls work more at home than boys. These results 
are intuitive and expected. 
 
The head of household characteristics also have an effect on the demand for household work. A 
higher head wage implies fewer hours of household work for a spouse. Also, a higher level of 
education for the head of a household is related to fewer hours of household work for a child. 
 
Regarding the group of household characteristics, I included six: number of adult women in the 
household; number of children in the zero-to-six age range, two dummy variables describing the 
materials of walls; the number of storeys of the dwelling; and water connection inside the 
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residence. Some of them were included in one regression only for identification purposes. The 
number of adult women in a house decreases a child’s household work and increases the spouse’s 
work, but the latter is not significant. This result makes sense because in less-developed countries, 
women play an important role in household work. Perhaps those adults engage in household 
production, giving more time to children to study or play. Also, the presence of children from zero 
to six years of age decreased the hours of child housework, but the parameter is not significant. It 
is also not significant for a spouse’s housework. 
 
Concerning house characteristics, the results show that in the case of “Material of Walls: Adobe”, 
the material reduces child housework compared to the rest of the categories: walls made of cane 
and mud, stone and mud, wood, matting, and others. In Peru, adobe walls are very common in 
poor rural houses in the sierra (highlands). In this area, children are used to working many hours 
outside the home, so it is reasonable that they have little time to spend at home doing housework. 
In contrast, walls made of bricks/concrete are common in cities in poor and non-poor areas. The 
effect on child housework is negative but not significant.  
 
Something different occurs in the case of the number of storeys and the water connection inside 
the dwelling. They were included only in the spouse’s regression because they had no impact on 
child housework. A larger house with more floors implies more spousal housework, and a water 
connection inside the dwelling causes less spousal housework. This last result is intuitive, since a 
house with a water connection requires less work of a housekeeper to get the water the family 
needs. 
 
The last group of variables in Table 3 is the group of sample selection variables that correct the 
double selection problem. They were significant in the spouse’s regression only. The set of 
goodness-of-fit statistics shows acceptable results, despite the low number of observations. The 
instruments selected passed the “rule of thumb” because the first-stage F statistic is greater than 10 
in both equations, so they are relevant. The Anderson test rejects the null hypothesis of 
underidentification. The Hansen J statistic tells us that we cannot reject the null of no correlation 
between the instruments and the error term. 
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4.3 Estimation of a household production function 
 
It is interesting to obtain the technical parameters of the production function. One way to do it is to 
compare the parameters in equations (8) and (9) with those in (5) and (6) and then solve for the 
parameters  . This is not difficult to do, but the standard errors have to be calculated by the delta 
method, which is not accurate here because of the low number of observations. Another weakness 
is that it is hard to impose a cross equation restriction in the estimation of equations (8) and (9) 
related to the equality of the second derivative 12
2
21
2 zzfzzf  . In terms of the 
parameter in (8) and (9), it is equivalent to impose the restriction 1112 //   . An alternative 
way is to estimate equations (5) and (6) directly as a system by IV, which produces estimates of 
the parameters of equation (4), and the “composite” parameters 1b  and 2b . Additionally, it is 
easier to impose the cross-equation restriction mentioned above, which is in this case 
simply 2112   . Therefore, I estimate (5) and (6) by 2SLS as a system taking 1z  and 2z  as 
endogenous and including the same group of variables and instruments in the regressions in Table 
3, including the sample selection variables 12Mˆ  and 21Mˆ
15.  
 
These regressions permit one to test easily if there are differences in the production function when 
the child who works at home is boy or girl. We could think that the parameter 22  (which 
represents the slope of the marginal return of child household work) may vary by sex. The next 
equation is an alternative specification of equation (7), where S is the dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the child is a boy and 0 if the child is a girl. The parameter 22  measures that gender 
effect. 
P
wzSzzb 22222221122 )(             (14) 
 
Table 4 shows the results for two regressions, with and without the cross-equation restriction. 
Column (I) shows the estimated parameters derived from the regressions in Table 3, whose 
standard errors were calculated by the delta method. That column is the only one that shows robust 
                                               
15 Unfortunately, the standard errors reported in STATA using this method are not heteroskedasticity robust. The 
STATA command I used is reg3 with the options 2sls and small. 
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standard errors. The other three columns were estimated “as a system” in the way explained above. 
Column (II) also assumes that 2112    and was estimated. We observe little change in the 
estimates, but important changes in the calculated “t-ratios”. The last two columns assume 
that 2112   , but the fourth one estimates (15) instead of (6). The parameters of all remaining 
control variables are not shown, but they were the same as those in Table 3. 
 
As we see, the estimates are very similar in the restricted and unrestricted model because 12 is 
very close to 21  in the unrestricted model. The negative sign of the parameters 11  and 22  
shows that the marginal products of labour are downward-sloping. The negative sign of ω12 is 
consistent with the hypothesis that labour inputs are substitutes. Furthermore, the sign of the 
determinant 21122211    is positive in all cases, which confirms that the production 
function is strictly concave because the   matrix in equation (5) is negative definite. 
 
Table 4. Parameters of the production function  
 ω12 ≠ ω21  ω12 = ω21 
 (I)  (II)   (III)  (IV)  
ω11 -0.1404 *** -0.1305 ***  -0.1307 *** -0.1304 *** 
 (-3.44)  (-3.56)   (-3.57)  (-3.60)  
ω12 -0.0342  -0.0325   -0.0351 * -0.0288 * 
 (-0.02)  (-0.58)   (-1.71)  (-1.77)  
ω21 -0.0385  -0.0355   -0.0351 * -0.0288 * 
 (-0.39)  (-1.61)   (-1.71)  (-1.77)  
ω22 -0.2382 *** -0.2026   -0.202 *** -0.1911 *** 
 (-9.15)  (-2.62) ***  (-2.64)  (-2.62)  
φ22 --  --   --  0.1518 ** 
        (2.02)  
          
 Δ = ω11 .ω22 -ω12 .ω21   0.0253   0.0252  0.0241  
 Δ' = ω11 .(ω22 + Φ22) -ω12 .ω22       0.0043  
                    
t-ratios in parenthesis          
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level.  
 
 
In the last two columns, all the parameters are significant at the level of 10%, including 22 . The 
parameter for boys is 2222   , and it is still negative, as expected, but is smaller in absolute value 
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than that for girls ( 22 ). This result suggests that the technology is different when a boy or girl 
does the housework. 
 
Finally, Table 5 shows the results of the predicted values of 1b  and 2b , which vary across 
individuals because they depend on the individual and household characteristics. The table has 
been divided in two. On top we see descriptive statistics on the predicted values of 1b  and 2b  when 
the child who does housework is a boy; on bottom we find the same statistics when the child is a 
girl. According to the economic theory, these predicted values should be strictly positive. 
Fortunately, only one observation was negative, with a value close to zero. 
 
Concerning the results for 1b  (a parameter of the spouse’s marginal product), there is little change 
whether the working child at home is boy or girl. On the other hand, 2b  is smaller for boys than for 
girls. These estimates, along with the estimation of the s' , tells us that girls are more productive 
at home than boys (at least up to some level). 
 
Table 5. Estimation of b1 and b2 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Boys      
b1 8.4320 1.9713 0.4011 16.6114 899 
b2 4.1840 1.3132 0.0328 10.0728 912 
      
Girls      
b1 8.9090 2.0088 -0.2628 14.4136 870 
b2 6.4435 1.3010 3.0125 11.8050 879 
            
 
 
From the results of the fourth column in Table 4 and those in Table 5, I have simulated the 
isoquants of the production function and the marginal products when the working child is a boy or 
girl. To construct this curves, I used the average values of 1b  and 2b . As we can easily observe in 
Figures 1 and 2, the slope and concavity are different in both sets of isoquants. In addition, when 
the child is a girl, fewer hours of child household work are required to produce a fixed level of 
output. 
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Finally, Figure 3 shows the marginal product curves for boys and girls, taking the average value of 
1b , 2b  and 1z . The graph shows that both curves are downward-sloping, and that girls are more 
productive than boys in the range of zero to 15 hours of household work per week. Beyond that 
point, boys have a higher marginal product.  
 
I propose two possible explanations for the latter result. One could be related to natural differences 
between boys and girls when it comes to do housework. Another more plausible explanation says 
that the observed difference in productivity could be the result of previous training in house 
chores, which could be the result of cultural differences16. Thus, if girls are trained to do 
housework since an early age, they would be more productive than boys due to human capital 
accumulation.  
 
                                               
16 I owe this idea to Cecilia Garavito. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Unlike other papers on child labour time allocation, this paper estimates the determinants of a 
child’s household work, stressing the role of its wage and the wages of other family members.  
 
The econometric estimation corrected two sources of the sample selection: the observation of 
child’s wage and spouse’s wage. Firstly, the method required us to estimate the participation of 
children and spouses in the labour market. Results found for the spouses are similar to those 
reported in standard theory of female participation in the labour market, because a large majority 
of spouses are women. In the case of child’s participation, the participation is greater for boys and 
it increases with age. Other household characteristics also influence the child’s participation in 
labour markets. 
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The results showed that the hours that individuals spend on household work depend negatively on 
their respective wages, and there are signs that the two inputs are substitutes. Additionally, hours 
spent on household work depend on individual characteristics like sex, age, head of household’s 
education and household characteristics. However, one shortcoming of these estimations is that the 
number of selected observations is very small compared to the total sample. 
 
Finally, the parameters of the quadratic home production function were estimated. The results are 
consistent with a strictly-concave production function. The estimates confirm that a child’s 
household work and a spouse’s household work are substitutes for each other. Besides, the 
isoquants show that when girls work at home, fewer hours of work are required to produce the 
output, and the graph of marginal products shows that girls are more productive than boys in the 
range of zero-to-15 hours per week, although the productivity of girls declines faster than that of 
boys. 
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